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

RAMPING UP TO FACE THE CHALLENGE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

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ARTICLES



ON THE COVER
Members of the 3rd Special Forces Group work in concert with Afghan police, soldiers and other security forces in the Tarin Kowt Province.
U.S. Army photo

DEPARTMENTS

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In August, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the Army Special Operations Command and the Department of the Army hosted the Irregular Warfare Conference so that Army general-purpose forces and special-operations forces could share their knowledge of the various aspects of IW and come to understand and appreciate each other's IW capabilities. It is our hope that this year's conference was and will remain a unifying influence that will allow GPF and SOF to address the challenges of IW and assist each other in preparing for successful IW operations.

Certainly there has never been a time with a greater need for cooperation. The 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* stated that the various components of IW are the dominant form of warfare confronting the United States. As Major Kirk Windmueller points out in this issue, for example, the challenge of ungoverned and under-governed regions is not only significant but growing. As a threat to international security and stability, they threaten to increasingly involve all elements of the U.S. military, as well as other elements of national power.

While the concept and challenges of IW have been present since at least the beginning of the 20th century, the question of how we will integrate our forces and train them for the tasks at hand is one that we have not yet answered. As Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic points out in his article in this issue, during previous periods of interest and discussion regarding IW, conflicting terminology, misunderstandings and impressions of elitism divided the Army into advocates and skeptics, and the antagonism was detrimental to the long-term improvement of our IW capabilities.

But in our current security environment, it is imperative that we cooperate and synchronize with the various elements of the Defense Department and other government agencies to develop a coherent IW strategy. Programs such as the new Interagency Exchange Program, highlighted in this issue, promise to increase understanding, cooperation and interoperability between the Army and other government agencies.

Our current definition of IW emphasizes the struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population. In that sense, the populace becomes the measure of our success. The emphasis on people is nothing new in special operations. In Psychological Operations, for instance, while considerable effort may be expended during a PSYOP campaign, the true measure of success is the effect that the actions have upon the behavior of the target audience. Training for Special Forces and Civil Affairs has a similar emphasis on the value of communicating with and earning the cooperation of the people. Courses for our SF and CA medical sergeants, for example, include training needed to conduct medical civic-action programs and provide veterinary care.

The success of partnership operations between GPF and SOF in the war on terror is encouraging, and tactics, techniques and procedures previously viewed as SOF-specific are now being employed throughout the Army. We must continue to work together to develop a unified vision for IW operations, training and leader development. While IW is not a SOF-only mission, SWCS and USASOC can and should be vital components of Army efforts to achieve a balanced IW approach now and in the future.

Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

PHILLIPS TAKES COMMAND OF THE 4TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP

The 4th Psychological Operations Group said farewell to a familiar face and welcomed a new one during a change of command ceremony on Fort Bragg's Meadows Memorial Field July 30.

Colonel Curtis D. Boyd relinquished command to Colonel Carl E. Phillips during the ceremony. Phillips comes to the 4th PSYOP Group from the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

"Colonel Boyd is leaving Colonel Phillips some big shoes to fill. Luckily, we pick commanders that can fill big shoes. We even issue a special size of boots just for that," said Lieutenant General John Mulholland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Mulholland also praised Boyd unit's accomplishments during his command.

"Under Curtis' leadership, the 4th PSYOP Group stood up nine new companies. Colonel Boyd, who was picked by the Army to serve over the only active-duty Psychological Operations group in existence, became the first ever 4th PSYOP commander to take his flag forward into the fight and lead the Joint PSYOP Task Force downrange."

Boyd's next assignment will be at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, where he will serve as the chief of staff. Before his departure, he took time to compliment his Soldiers for their professionalism.

"On the field in front of you is a one-of-a-kind group, in fact a global leader. There is no other single organization in the Department of Defense that possesses the human, intellectual and technical capacity to plan, analyze, develop, produce and disseminate full-spectrum, multimedia Psychological Operations like the assembly of young men and women standing before you," Boyd said.

^ **CHANGING OF THE GUARD** Lieutenant General John Mulholland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, passes the 4th Psychological Operations Group guidon to Colonel Carl E. Phillips during a ceremony on Meadows Field. *U.S. Army photo.*

During the past two years, the group has grown considerably, increasing its ranks by roughly 20 percent during the past year alone.

Phillips, who in the past commanded the 9th PSY0P Battalion, thanked Boyd for his hard work, sacrifice and dedication.

"I've known Curt for 13 years, and I know that every decision he makes he always makes with the interests of the unit, Soldiers and their families at the forefront," Phillips said. "I look forward to the challenges of command and opportunities that lay ahead for the 4th PSYOP Group as we continue to provide the best possible PSYOP support for the warfighters deployed around the globe."

Phillips plans on continuing the developments started by Boyd, including restructuring the battalions into a more modular force. He also looks forward to following in Boyd's footsteps by leading the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force downrange. — *4th PSYOP Group PAO*

SWCS, ARI TO SURVEY THE PSYOP FORCE

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine, in partnership with the Army Research Institute, has announced the upcoming release of a Psychological Operations doctrine and training survey.

The purpose of the survey will be to collect information regarding PSYOP doctrinal publications, Soldier language skills and cultural training and education. The results of the survey will be used to identify issues, practices and gaps that need to be addressed in future doctrine. Results will also be used as a basis for determining future training requirements for PSYOP officers and NCOs. ARI is scheduled to e-mail the survey to PSYOP Soldiers during the fourth quarter of this fiscal year. The survey will be the first in a series designed to obtain critical and relevant data for improving the quality of doctrine and training for Army- and joint-level PSYOP leaders.

For more information, telephone Lynn Gilfus, DOTD PSYOP Division, at DSN 236-1318, commercial (910) 396-1318, or send e-mail to: gilfusl@soc.mil.

WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

INTERAGENCY EXCHANGE PROGRAM IMPROVES ARMY'S RELATIONSHIPS WITH WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT

By Captain Bryan Gibb

Building and maintaining strong relationships between the United States Army and its governmental partners is essential to bringing forth a positive outcome in the war on terror. With that end in mind, Lieutenant General William Caldwell, the commandant of the Command and General Staff College, or CGSC, and the commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., developed the Interagency Exchange Program in order to "improve how we as an Army work in conjunction with other governmental departments and agencies."

The IA program, now in its pilot year, affords Army captains and majors the opportunity to join national agencies for a one-year, interagency fellowship. As interagency fellows, they replace a civilian government employee within the partnered organization, giving that employee the opportunity to attend the one-year CGSC Intermediate Level Education, or ILE. The intent of this cross-pollination of Army officers and governmental civilians is to increase collaboration, cooperation and interoperability to better serve the unified approach described in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*.

Serving as an Army IA fellow is both an outstanding professional-development opportunity and an excellent mechanism for imparting a company-grade officer's tactical- and operational-level experiences to members of a national-level organization. I was selected to serve an IA fellowship with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or NGA. Before my NGA assignment, I attended ILE at Fort Belvoir, Va. ILE was an excellent venue for fostering strategic-level thinking in someone who was about to report to an organization that has a national mission and focus. I began my NGA fellowship Oct. 1, 2008, and my first task was to develop a proposal with key leaders on how I could best serve the agency and simultaneously receive a broadening, professional-development experience. We determined that I should first receive formal training and orientation to the organization, followed by a period during which I could apply my tactical and operational experiences as a Special Forces officer to help shape the way that NGA supports the warfighter.

My initial introduction to NGA was participating in the biannual conference held by the NGA support teams, or NSTs. Members of the NGA's mission-partner organizations, such as other intelligence agencies and the combatant commands, are embedded on NSTs to ensure that they provide relevant, timely geospatial intelligence. Senior NGA personnel attended

the conference to address common issues and to synchronize the organization's efforts to support its mission partners. Early in my fellowship, I attended a number of strategic-level meetings in order to understand the focus and direction of the organization. My attendance at the NST conference and at meetings of key leaders gave me valuable insight into who NGA supports and the way it tailors its intelligence products to meet the needs of its mission partners.

After this period of garnering the strategic vision, I attended two formal NGA courses to gain a better understanding of how the organization operates. The first, the two-week Geospatial-Intelligence Orientation Seminar, gives participants exposure to a number of NGA directorates and demonstrates how those organizations fit into NGA's strategic objectives. The second, the Geospatial Staff Officer Course, provides a baseline understanding of the way NGA collects and disseminates geospatial-intelligence to the intelligence community. Those courses gave me an excellent introduction to NGA's capabilities and an appreciation of the multitude of strategic-level intelligence requirements that the agency fulfills for our nation on a daily basis. The orientation I received to NGA was outstanding professional development, because it explained the operations of not only NGA but also the entire intelligence community. Because of NGA's close collaboration with a number of intelligence organizations, such as the CIA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, I was exposed to their operations, as well — a byproduct of an age of information sharing and cooperation.

Following the institutional orientation, NGA provided me access to a number of its analysis and production branches for a one-to-two-week internship to gain firsthand knowledge of the way analysts support the warfighter. I had the opportunity to sit with a number of NGA branches that provide geospatial products in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, or OIF, and Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF. In addition to speaking to analysts about their work, I was asked to share with department personnel my experiences in receiving and using NGA products as a detachment commander during OEF. Those briefings generated a lot of discussion on the ways geospatial products can benefit warfighters at the tactical level, and the discussions became the catalyst for a special project that I could manage to support NGA's wartime focus.

During the remainder of my NGA fellowship, I will conduct a study of the ways NGA supports theater special-operations forces. The study will make recommendations on the best ways to tailor NGA's relationship with theater combined joint special-operations task forces, or CJSOTFs, to meet the CJSOTFs' geospatial-intelligence requirements, and on ways that support can benefit detachment-level operations. The basis for the study is my exposure to the way NGA currently supports its national military partners. I am studying ways of incorporating into theater-level SOF operations some of NGA's outstanding tactics, techniques and procedures developed to support our national military assets. My study began with visits to the 7th and 10th Special Forces groups to receive firsthand accounts of NGA's support to those groups' recent deployments to OIF and OEF. Following discussions with those redeployed units, I traveled to the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility to continue the study with the 5th and 3rd SF groups.

In addition to making recommendations on ways that NGA can maximize its support to deployed SOF forces, I am working to increase SF's awareness of NGA's unique capabilities. Geospatial intelligence is an extremely powerful tool that can combine multiple sources of intelligence into one product that increases situational awareness and understanding. With SF's unique mission set, executing kinetic and nonkinetic operations as part of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, geospatial intelligence can be a powerful decision-making tool for tactical- and operational-level mission planning and execution. I will continue to engage the SF groups in order to increase cooperation and interoperability between the two organizations and to highlight the strategic, operational and tactical implications of geospatial-intelligence.

> **"There are no longer only military solutions to conflict; we must embrace a whole-of-government approach."**

By design, the interagency fellowship was implemented by Army leaders to increase understanding and cooperation between the Army and our interagency mission partners. According to Lieutenant General Caldwell, "There are no longer only military solutions to conflict; we must embrace a whole-of-government approach." As a member of the pilot program, I feel the initiative is an outstanding way to use the tactical and operational knowledge of mid-level Army leaders to positively affect the contributions made by our country's national-level organizations and bring a positive outcome to the war on terror. ***SW***

Captain Bryan Gibb is an SF officer serving as an interagency fellow with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. He was previously a detachment commander and company executive officer in the 7th SF Group.

Cracking the Code on Measures of Effectiveness:

The Alfred H. Paddock Psychological Operations Essay Contest

The future relevance of Psychological Operations and the continued high demand for timely, precise tactical and operational methods of influence suggest the need for new measures of effectiveness across the full range of military and interagency operations.

To address that need, the 4th Psychological Operations Group held an essay contest named in honor of Dr. Alfred H. Paddock, who was the first honorary colonel of the U.S. Army Psychological Operations Regiment and a recipient of the Psychological Operations Association's General Richard G. Stilwell Award. During his military career, Paddock commanded the 6th PSYOP Battalion, Fort Bragg, N.C., and the 4th PSYOP Group during the 1980s.

Dr. Paddock is the author of U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (revised edition), published by the University Press of Kansas, as well as numerous articles and book chapters on special-operations topics.

The annual essay contest was open to any service member or civilian in the special-operations community. Despite high operational tempos and deployments, 13 individuals stepped up to the challenge. An independent panel of judges reviewed the entries. Results of the contest were: 1st place – Sergeant Christopher E. Howard; 2nd place – Captain Gregory S. Seese; and 3rd place – Sergeant First Class Mervyn E. Roberts III.

1st Place Essay:

Back to Basics: Returning to PSYOP Doctrine to Solve the 'MOE Riddle'

by Sergeant Christopher E. Howard

One of the most perplexing problems facing the PSYOP community is measuring the effectiveness of Psychological Operations. The larger the scale of the PSYOP effort, the more complex the problem grows, thus making operational PSYOP of a national or regional scope more difficult to measure than tactical efforts of limited scope.

Units often rely on measures of performance, or MOP, — showing what and how much they did — in lieu of measures of effectiveness, or MOE, because the former are comparatively easier to ascertain. But MOP alone do not answer the critical question, "Is the PSYOP effort working?" Although MOP serve a purpose, the greater emphasis should always be on obtaining valid, accurate MOE, since they provide decision-makers with the information necessary to determine which efforts deserve continued funding, which should be used as templates for future efforts and which should be adjusted or even abandoned.

Solving the MOE riddle requires that PSYOP planners and analysts do the "heavy lifting" before initiating PSYOP. Establishing the criteria for assessment requires solid planning and analysis. Unfortunately, those activities are often dispensed with in the name of expediency. Once analysts realize that there is a problem, which typically does not occur until after PSYOP has been initiated, they think it is too late to fix the problem. Pressed to provide MOE but lacking a sound analytical foundation, they may choose to rely on MOP, spontaneous events and spurious correlations. At that point, "confirmation bias" rears its head, and any anecdotal evidence that can be construed as MOE is presented as such.

One caveat to planners trying to develop and use MOEs is that while they are useful, they are rarely definitive. Any expectation of direct, incontrovertible impact indicators is unrealistic. While there is a greater potential at the tactical level for playing out the "golden leaflet" scenario — where there is a direct correlation between the product and its effect — the cluttered nature of the information battlefield at the operational level makes that expectation unreasonable. The more variables that are introduced into the equation, such as the efforts of other PSYOP/IO entities, kinetic operations and a myriad of other, often competing, factors, the more problematic that measuring the effectiveness of a PSYOP effort becomes. Even when there is substantial positive movement toward the accomplishment of a PSYOP objective, or PO, or supporting PSYOP objective, or SPO, it is difficult to determine with any certainty the degree to which a PSYOP effort played a role in that development.

Despite that drawback, the rigorous application of existing doctrine, combined with some creative, "outside the box" thinking and increased cooperation within the ARSOF and PSYOP communities and with other U.S. government agencies, will go a long way toward dispelling the belief

^ **AIR MAIL** PSYOP Soldiers prepare for a leaflet drop over Afghanistan. Through coordination with other governmental agencies, the messages are designed to affect the attitudes and behaviors of the citizens. *U.S. Army photo.*

that valid MOE are unattainable for operational PSYOP. PSYOP doctrine, as set forth in FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, provides a foundation for developing MOE that prevents the need to "reinvent the wheel."

A sound, common-sense adherence to the principles already established in FM 3-05.301 can forestall the need for ad hoc MOE invention. The following are the most essential elements of doctrine that, if given the proper attention, will lead to valid, accurate MOE:

1. Use only measurable SPOs, following an "increase/decrease" formula that avoids absolutes such as "does not," "ceases," "refrains from," etc. This is the single most important factor, because a bad SPO automatically impairs assessment efforts.

2. Determine the specific action desired from the selected target audience, or TA. This "desired behavior" must contribute to the accomplishment of the SPO, but in many cases, the behavior will be more specific — and thus more measurable — than the SPO. The desired behavior provides the central data point for determining behavioral change.

3. Determine, through careful, accurate analysis, why the TA is not engaging in the desired behavior (i.e., why it is engaging in an alternate behavior). That information identifies the attitudinal indicators that, if altered favorably, should lead to behavioral change.

4. Derive baseline data for behavioral and attitudinal indicators from the internal and external causes of the TA's current behavior.

In addition to this "back to the basics" implementation of PSYOP doctrine, the following steps should also be taken:

1. Develop and maintain awareness of other entities who may be seeking to influence the TA's attitudes, opinions, beliefs and behaviors. These entities will most likely include friendly and adversarial forces.

2. Develop feedback mechanisms for soliciting feedback from the TA, such as text messaging, e-mail or telephone numbers.

3. Improve coordination with other agencies of the DoD and the U.S. government in order to improve the collection of data related to selected attitudinal and behavioral indicators.

All of the above steps should result in the development of a statistically valid trend line that accounts for attitudinal and behavioral indicators. These indicators should be overlaid on a dissemination matrix that accounts for all relevant influence efforts. Pertinent MOP data should also be included, when available. Although the trends analysis may yield an ornate PowerPoint slide, that should not be its sole result. The "meat" of the analysis should be a narrative that summarizes actions taken and provides a detailed interpretation of the data provided.

Though it may be fair to say that no "most effective way to measure effectiveness" truly exists for operational-level PSYOP, a sound procedure does exist in the form of the PSYOP process established in FM 3-05.301. If PSYOP planners follow that process, then efforts to measure its effectiveness will be limited only by individual creativity and the willingness of the various actors in the PSYOP community, the DoD and the U.S. government to cooperate in the interest of the common good.

Sergeant Christopher E. Howard is assigned to the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion. He has deployed to Iraq and Qatar in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, serving with the Psychological Operations Task Force-Iraq and the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force. Howard holds a bachelor's in history and secondary education from Appalachian State University.

2nd Place Essay: Measuring Psychological Operations: It's All About the SPO

by Major Gregory S. Seese

"The mission of psychological operations (PSYOP) is to influence the behavior of foreign target audiences (TAs) to support of U.S. national objectives. PSYOP accomplish this by conveying selected information and/or advising on actions that influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign audiences. Behavioral change is at the root of the PSYOP mission. Although concerned with the mental processes of the TA, it is the observable modification of TA behavior that determines the mission success of PSYOP (FM 3-05.30,* Psychological Operations, *April 2005)."

In Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, the purpose of evaluation is to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP in achieving the supporting PSYOP objectives, or SPOs. Frequently, PSYOP planners get caught up in trying to measure behavioral outcomes instead of specific behaviors, and we craft measures of effectiveness, or MOEs, that are beyond the scope of PSYOP, thus leading to unrealistic expectations. PSYOP forces can realistically measure only the results of their own efforts. Yet they are frequently asked to provide assessment results that encompass theaterwide strategic objectives.

Although PSYOP is very much concerned with influencing attitudes, values and beliefs of a target audience, or TA, the ultimate success of PSYOP missions is determined by the observable modification of TA behavior. Therefore, any systematic means of assessing and evaluating PSYOP efforts must measure changes in behavior.

The key to measuring behavior change and the effectiveness of PSYOP, whether in support of conventional or special operations, is planning. If a PSYOP planner fails to develop specific, measurable and observable SPOs, the evaluation process falls apart. In addition to developing specific, measurable and observable SPOs, planners must understand the difference between behaviors and behavioral outcomes. PSYOP objectives,

or POs, are behavioral outcomes, while SPOs are specific, observable behaviors. A frequent mistake in planning is developing SPOs that are behavioral outcomes; that is, they are the end result of specific behaviors, not behaviors themselves.

For example, "reducing acts of violence," which is the end result of other behaviors, is a behavioral outcome, yet it is frequently used as a SPO. Take a non-PSYOP example: If a PO is "Increase success on college exams," specific behaviors to reach that outcome might be "Attend all class lectures" and "Study 30 minutes every evening," both of which are specific, measurable and observable behaviors.

A PSYOP series focuses on one TA in accomplishing one SPO. Therefore, to measure the effectiveness of the PSYOP series, one need only measure the effectiveness of the PSYOP series in getting the TA to perform the specific behavior outlined in the SPO.

To put it another way, we could compare a PSYOP element to an advertising team. The team has been hired by a smoking-addiction clinic in town to advertise its services. The goal, or PO, that supports the clinic is "Reduce smoking in the town." But what are the specific behaviors that the advertising team needs to get the TA to support the clinic's PO?

First, the team hasn't been hired to get people to stop smoking, so running anti-smoking campaigns isn't what they need to do. Second, the specific behaviors that the addiction clinic wants the TA (smokers) to perform are to call the clinic and request information about the program, to log onto the Web site and sign up for the monthly addiction newsletter, and to enroll in the resident addiction programs. The MOEs for these are the number of calls the clinic gets, the number of people who sign up for the newsletters, and the number of people enrolled in the addiction program. It's not the advertising team's job to measure the PO — that is beyond their scope and not a realistic expectation.

A PSYOP-specific example of a PO could be "Reduce drug trafficking in the State of Chihuahua." The specific behaviors that may contribute to the reduction of drug-trafficking include the reporting of drug dealers to authorities on anonymous tip lines, and citizens joining neighborhood-watch programs to patrol the streets. The PSYOP MOE is not a reduction in drug-trafficking, it is the number of reports made on the tip line and the number of people who joined the neighborhood-watch program and patrolled the streets. PSYOP MOE simply show how effective the PSYOP series is in accomplishing the SPO.

Operators also frequently fall into the trap of trying to use polls and surveys as MOE, but polls and surveys are designed to measure attitudes and public opinion, not changes in behavior. They also provide no information as to which PSYOP series is being effective.

To further improve PSYOP MOE, developing SPOs that create behaviors that didn't exist before or that cannot exist by themselves will help us determine whether a behavior change was caused by PSYOP or was the result of other influences. For example, SPOs such as "TA reports terrorist activity on the new coalition hotline," and "TA signs up for 'friends of the coalition' newsletter," both create behaviors that didn't exist before. There was no coalition hotline in the past, nor was there a coalition newsletter. Therefore, if the TA begins engaging in these behaviors, it is the direct result of PSYOP.

In conclusion, many different methods have been proposed over the years for measuring the effectiveness of PSYOP. To date, developing effective MOEs remains one of the most difficult things for the PSYOP community to accomplish. Much of that difficulty can be blamed on unrealistic expectations of what PSYOP MOE are and the poor development of supporting objectives. The only way to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP is to measure changes in behavior. To do that effectively, planners must learn to develop specific, measurable, observable SPOs and be able to discern between behaviors and behavioral outcomes. While developing good SPOs is only part of the task of developing MOE, it is the first and most essential part. Ultimately, unless new behaviors are specified, we still have only correlation, not causality. This is the starting point, not the destination.

"Although PSYOP is very much concerned with influencing attitudes, values and beliefs of a target audience, or TA, the ultimate success of PSYOP missions is determined by the observable modification of TA behavior. Therefore, any systematic means of assessing and evaluating PSYOP efforts must measure changes in behavior."

Major Gregory Seese is an educational psychologist serving as the chief of the PSYOP Training Branch of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Training and Doctrine. His assignments include medical platoon leader, PSYOP detachment commander, PSYOP operations officer and Civil Affairs team leader. He served in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Operation Enduring Freedom with the 3rd and 19th Special Forces groups.

3rd Place Essay: Measuring the Effectiveness of Psychological Operations In Support of Irregular Warfare

by Sergeant First Class Mervyn E. Roberts

Historically, the challenge of measuring the effectiveness of the activities and products of Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, has dogged military forces. That has been especially true in irregular-warfare operations, which tend to require PSYOP support over a longer term and deal with more complex issues than conventional operations. It is rare that direct measurement of PSYOP's effectiveness is possible. A considerable amount of energy may be expended, but the results can be assessed only tangentially.

Much research has been done over the years in the realm of social science in an effort to develop a method for evaluating PSYOP's effectiveness. In 1971, Ernest and Edith Bairdain completed an extensive study on the measurement of PSYOP effectiveness during the Vietnam War.[1] Additionally, an entire chapter in *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application*, Vol. Two, covers the subject.[2] More recently, Captain Greg Seese and Sergeant First Class Paul Smith, writing in *Special Warfare*, did a good job laying out a method for developing quantifiable PSYOP objectives.[3] Additional classified and unclassified studies have added to the discussion of ways of assessing the effectiveness of PSYOP in the war on terror.

One of the problems noted in earlier conflicts was the lack of reliable data from which to draw conclusions. In many ways, in the current conflict the opposite is true: Often the problem is not the lack of information but rather the difficulty of gathering, collating and analyzing data under wartime conditions.

In addition to PSYOP team reports, most units issue operational reports. Civil Affairs teams and human-terrain teams gather much useful data, and synchronized predeployment and operation tracker reports and intelligence products are readily available in theater via the Secure Internet Protocol Network. Additional data is available from various agencies of the UN and nongovernment organizations. So much data can be collected from so many different sources that the

problem is bringing it together into a usable format.

The resolution of the problem lies in tying information regarding PSYOP product distribution to the wealth of available intelligence data. To ensure effective analysis, teams need to collect and report detailed product-distribution data tied to a specific map-grid location, including the 100m identifier. That data is often more important than their subjective assessment of PSYOP impact indicators.

Using geographical information systems, units can then bring the distribution data together to form a better picture of what is happening. Since all PSYOP product numbers contain the relevant PSYOP objective, or PO, and supporting PSYOP objective, or SPO, knowing the geographical distribution for each PSYOP product can be crucial to the analysis of its effectiveness. As PSYOP teams report on the distribution of their products, that data can be overlaid on maps created using the ArcGIS geospatial information software suite.[4]

For example, a PO may be to decrease IED attacks. Data on IED attacks and IEDs reported or turned in can be imported from a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet into ArcGIS. At the same time, data regarding PSYOP teams' distribution of products and radio messages pertaining to that PO can be imported. With the analysis tools built into ArcGIS, the software can create maps that show trends that might otherwise be lost in the cascade of daily reports. Over time, units can begin to see correlations between their products and effects.

For radio products, the team must gather detailed information on radio coverage. In Afghanistan, for instance, a simple broadcast circle will miss much of the complexity of broadcasting in that country. In the field, PSYOP teams must check to determine which radio stations broadcast into which valleys. By stopping in a valley and rotating the dial of a radio to see which stations are available, they can quickly create a detailed map of coverage. During a deployment in 2007, a tactical PSYOP detachment created a simple report that a team could complete during a halt on patrol. The report listed time of day, location (grid coordinates), frequencies heard and any notes the detachment wanted to make. Using that report, a PSYOP unit could produce an effective map of countrywide radio coverage during one rotation. If the unit passed that data along at the end of its rotation, succeeding units would need only to double-check the report.

Since time is of the essence in combat, we need to radically rethink the process of doing situation reports, or SITREPs. Although a narrative format may still make sense in some cases, most of the data needs to be in a standardized format, such as an Excel worksheet. All data needs to be in a format that allows easy importation into ArcGIS at the company or PSYOP-task-force level. That way it could be easily imported in to ArcGIS for analysis. For radio play-lists, units could create a weekly or monthly report of messages broadcast. For paper products, they could use an Excel insert to the SITREP which would show, at a minimum, map grid, product number and quantity.

Once all the data has been collected and loaded into ArcGIS, using the methods described by Captain Seese and Sergeant First Class Smith for developing POs and SPOs, operators could identify clearly quantifiable behaviors. They could then choose data sets that would allow them to test whether changes in behavior could be detected. From that point, they could create useful reports on the products' effectiveness. Data from a myriad of sources can be overlaid and analyzed to help pinpoint effective locations for the distribution of particular products.

PSYOP teams must understand that the collection of data for analysis is at least as important as the conduct of operations. Without critical analysis, PSYOP teams become nothing more than "paper-boys" handing out products. To that end, reporting needs to be rethought to ensure that teams are not overburdened with reports, at the same time making certain that they are collecting the appropriate data needed for conducting effective analysis. The use of ArcGIS should also become standardized within PSYOP, so that analysis can be accomplished efficiently at the PSYOP company and PSYOP-task-force level.

"PSYOP teams must understand that the collection of data for analysis is at least as important as the conduct of operations."

Notes:

[1] Ernest and Edith Bairdain, *Psychological Operations Studies-Vietnam Final Technical Report* (Human Sciences Inc., 25 May 1971).

[2] United States Army, DA Pam 525-7-2, *The Art And Science Of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application*. Volume Two, 1974.

[3] Gregory Seese and Paul N. Smith, "Measuring PSYOP Effectiveness," *Special Warfare*, Vol. 21, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 2008), 31-34.

[4] ARCGis: http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/index.html.

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So long as the present ideological conflict between East and West continues, so long as the mutual balance of terror makes a hot war improbable, and so long as the stresses and strains of nationalism and radicalism add fuel to the fire, the Western allies are likely to find themselves involved willy-nilly in a prolonged series of cold war operations, in many of which, by their very nature, the guerrilla and counterguerrilla will inevitably have their part to play. It is therefore important to keep under constant review the laws and principles which govern the conduct of irregular warfare.

— Sir Fitzroy Maclean as part of the foreword to Charles Thayer's *Guerrilla*[1]

RAMPING UP TO FACE THE CHALLENGE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

by Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic

In the 1960s and again in the 1980s, the U.S. military experienced a revival of interest in irregular warfare, or IW, similar to the one that is occurring today. In both of the previous periods, the topic enjoyed a celebrity-like popularity in professional military forums until such time that circumstances allowed it to be relegated back to the margins in favor of a return to "proper soldiering."

Both previous revivals produced high-quality doctrine and curriculum in professional-education courses. So why, then, did IW fail to become ingrained as part of the military mainstream? The manner in which a topic is framed can significantly influence the opinion of the target audience. Suggesting that IW is the graduate level of warfare, while clearly expressing the topic's difficulty, fails to recognize the considerable effort that the Army has invested in mastering major combat operations, or MCO. Given the imbalance between the Army's investment in MCO and in IW, it's not surprising that, by comparison, IW appears more difficult and complex. Over the last several decades, old IW concepts have often been reintroduced or reinvented under new names, such as "low-intensity conflict" and "military operations other than war." While there is no question that those concepts are complex, presenting them as new byproducts of emerging and changing world conditions, such as globalization, urbanization and radicalization, brings into question not only the enduring nature of the IW requirement but also whether these conflicts are, in fact, merely anomalies to be weathered. While labels and marketing techniques may be helpful in reconciling our collective discomfort with the topic, they undermine the overall integration of the topic by further entrenching skeptics.

As was the case in the past, today's debate has the potential to divide the military into two camps: advocates and skeptics. Regrettably, the discussion often moves away from the specifics of IW to devolve into a debate over whether conventional or irregular warfare is superior or more difficult and how limited resources should be allotted. The argument for either discipline to take precedence over the other will likely remain a self-defeating one in the long term. The reality seems clear that whether or not the U.S. military accepts IW as an enduring part of the realm of conflict, it has been a normal condition throughout the last century, and all indications are that it will remain so through the first half of this century — alongside major, large-scale combat operations. While the topic of IW is clearly not new, the concept of how it will be defined, what it will encompass and how it will be integrated into the current portfolio of the U.S. military is. The terminology chosen to define this topic will be critical, not only in terms of its clarity but also for the perception that must accompany it. Unfortunately, the topic comes already enmeshed in the significantly confusing terminology created during previous periods of interest.

The joint operating concept, or JOC, outlines the process of incorporating IW within the military. JOCs are different from doctrine, which is based on time-proven practices. JOCs are intended to link strategic guidance to the development of future capabilities. JOCs can ultimately lead to changes in policy, doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, personnel and facilities.

IW is currently defined in DoD Directive 3000.07 as "a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will."[3]

The current definition for IW was deliberately written to emphasize its focus on the population. DoDD 3000.07 also identifies five subordinate categories that compose IW:

counterinsurgency, or COIN; counterterrorism, or CT; foreign internal defense, or FID; stability operations, or SO; and unconventional warfare, or UW.[4]

Since 1954, the Army has maintained a continuous base of significant expertise in IW within the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., (renamed the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, in 1963, following the death of President John F. Kennedy). The Special Warfare Center originally taught three training courses: the UW Course, the COIN Course and the Psychological Warfare Course. Since that time, the SWCS course load has expanded to encompass a much larger variety in courses of instruction, with an increasing throughput of students. SWCS also maintains more than 80 doctrinal and training publications and has technical review authority for three joint publications.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

UW is defined as activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force in a denied area.

The concept of UW was developed largely from the experiences of World War II Soldiers who worked with resistance movements. The term UW was formally introduced into doctrine in 1955, specifically to convey a wider responsibility than simply working alongside guerrilla forces and conducting guerrilla warfare. Early leaders within the Special Forces, or SF, community recognized the criticality of achieving a holistic strategy that would not exclude the less familiar but equally important aspects of resistance, such as subversion, developing supporting clandestine infrastructure, sabotage and intelligence-related activities.

SF (and SWCS) have been and remain the Army's proponent for UW training, doctrine and execution. The UW Course was designed to prepare NCOs and officers to infiltrate enemy territory, link up with resistance forces and provide the full spectrum of training, support and advice needed to enable those forces and synchronize their efforts with those of the U.S. The course continues to this day, although it is now formally referred to as the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC, or as the "Q Course."

COUNTERINSURGENCY

COIN is defined as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.

A logical counterpart to the UW instruction was the development of the Counterinsurgency Course. SWCS began incorporating doctrine on COIN operations into FM 31-21, *Special Forces Operations*, in 1965. The schoolhouse also established the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center Department of Counterinsurgency that collaborated on other Army doctrine such as FM 31-15, *Operations Against Irregular Forces*; FM 31-16, *Counterguerrilla Operations*; and special texts such as ST 31-76, the *COIN Planning Guide*.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

FID is defined as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.

As troop levels in Vietnam began to draw down in 1970, interest in COIN doctrine began to wane. The result was that the doctrine of the 1970s retained the COIN lessons learned in Vietnam and reflected the topic as military assistance to allied partner nations. In 1977, a chapter on FID replaced the chapter on COIN in FM 31-20, *Special Forces Operations*. Since the development of the FID concept, SWCS has remained the proponent for its doctrine. The Military Assistance Training Advisor Course, which stood up at the Special Warfare Center in 1962, trained joint military personnel in the skills required to serve as advisers, predominantly in South Vietnam. The training included language instruction that was similar to that of the UW Course. Although the MATA course closed in 1970, many of its lessons were retained and incorporated into the Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs courses. The topic of FID proved to be so valuable that in 1994, SWCS produced the first FID field manual. That eventually led to the development of JP 3.07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, which was written for the joint military community by the U.S. Special Operations Command.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

SO is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief.

Stability operations, like FID, saw doctrine developments as interest in COIN lessened following Vietnam. Much COIN doctrine was incorporated into the stability-operations chapter of FM 31-20, as well as into the Psychological Operations, SF and Civil Affairs courses. In 1967, the handbook from the MATA course was used to develop Field Manual 31-73, *Handbook for Advisors in Stability Operations.*

COUNTERTERRORISM

DoDD 3000.07 defines CT as operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt and respond to terrorism. Although there is little doctrine or curriculum related to the topic of CT, FM 3.05.20 (formerly FM 31-20), *Special Forces Operations*,

That, in a nutshell, is what makes the difference between defeat and victory in revolutionary war: the people and the army must emerge on the same side of the fight. And that is why it is so important to understand that guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest, and that no matter how expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political rationale.

— Bernard Fall, *Street Without Joy*[2]



The Afghan national flag was raised above Khan Neshin castle in the Rig District Center, July 8, for the first time, signaling the arrival of Afghan governance in the southern reaches of Helmand province. ***U.S. Army photo***

^ **CLASS IN SESSION** A PSYOP Soldier instructs Afghan PSYOP soldiers in developing PSYOP products. *U.S. Army photo.*

has included material on CT since 1977, and SWCS continues to conduct several courses related to countering terrorism. The subordinate categories of CT are: hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations and attacks against terrorist infrastructure. As indicated in Title 10, U.S. Code, CT, along with UW and FID, has been a core activity for special-operations forces since 1987.

As it did during the mid-1960s and -1980s, the Army has done an exceptional job of relearning, re-establishing and re-institutionalizing its capability in the IW realm, but at a significant cost. In order for this period of interest to succeed where previous ones have failed, the focus must remain on institutionalizing the subject as a valid peer to other military subjects. IW must become a mainstream topic of the profession of arms rather than merely a fringe specialty relegated to a select few. Conversely, it must not be regarded (by the few) as an elite discipline, with the attendant pejorative view toward other military disciplines. History has shown that insurgency and terrorism will remain a normal part of the spectrum of conflict, often requiring the application of military power in order to preserve or protect U.S. national interests. The new challenge for this millennium is not the threat posed by IW or even how the Army will meet the challenge but rather how the Army will prepare itself for long-term success.

NOTES

[1] Charles W. Thayer, *Guerrilla* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).
[2] Bernard Fall, *Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1994).
[3] *DoD Directive 3000.07* (Dec. 1, 2008), 11.
[4] *DoD Directive 3000.07,* 2.

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STATE OF CHAOS:
SECURITY THREATS FROM UNGOVERNED AND UNDER-GOVERNED SPACES

By Major Kirk Windmueller

When looking at a world map, we might make the assumption that the states depicted are capable of exercising sovereign control over all areas within their borders. However, this is frequently not the case, as there are regions and pockets of territory all over the world where the state is unable to exert the authority one normally expects from a national government.

The United States and its global partners will continue to face challenges that emerge in weak and failing states and areas lacking in responsible state authority. The bottom line is that current trends in these places will continue and are capable of affecting U.S. and international security and stability. Ungoverned and under-governed spaces will contribute to and compound security problems now and well into the future. While the solution to these problems often requires an orchestrated effort of the elements of national power, in many cases, the burden may fall heavily on the U.S. military.

UNGOVERNED SPACES

"Ungoverned space" is at best an imperfect term. Most areas of the world, if they are not ruled by an internationally recognized body, are at least under the control of some form of authority, whether it be a tribe, clan, militia, gang, cartel, local strongman, insurgent group or other power. At worst, the phrase reveals a delusional notion: that it is normal or natural for a government to have control over all the territory within its defined borders.

A 2007 RAND study said the following about ungoverned territories:

Since the end of the Cold War, failed or failing states and ungoverned territories within otherwise viable states have become a more common international phenomenon. Many of the crises that have required intervention by U.S. or international forces were produced by the collapse or absence of state authority. These ungoverned territories generate all manner of security problems, such as civil conflict and humanitarian crises, arms and drug smuggling, piracy and refugee flows. They threaten regional stability and security and generate demands on U.S. military resources. The problem of dealing with ungoverned areas has taken on increased urgency since 9/11, which demonstrated how terrorists can use sanctuaries in the most remote and hitherto ignored regions of the world to mount devastating attacks against the United States and its friends and allies.[1]

Weakly governed and failed states can provide sanctuary for global terrorism and are a breeding ground for a myriad of other problems. They serve

as pathways for the spread of pandemics, facilitate the activities of criminal and insurgent networks, and can create humanitarian and refugee problems that overflow into other regions.

Writing in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Robert D. Kaplan refers to these fringe areas as "Injun Country,"[2] which may be a misleading term if we infer from it that those regions will eventually be brought under control by the ordered world. In fact, many places are going in the exact opposite direction. Despite increased efforts of the West to improve the conditions in many of these states, the number of weak and poorly governed nations that can provide a breeding ground for global terrorism has risen sharply over the last several years, according to a 2006 World Bank report. The number of "fragile" countries, whose deepening poverty puts them at risk from terrorism, armed conflict and epidemic disease, has risen from 17 to 26 since the previous report, issued in 2003.[3]

Another dynamic related to weak and under-governed states is the potential for "rapid collapse." While many weak states have chronic problems that persist for generations, their weakness allows for containment and a certain degree of management over the long term. However, rapid collapse of states frequently comes as a surprise, as a state can appear to be stable on the surface, but underlying conditions can boil over suddenly and spiral catastrophically into chaos. One example of this phenomenon was the collapse of Yugoslavia into a bloody civil war, which led to a humanitarian disaster that affected the entire region.

Three current examples from different regions of the world show how the activities occurring in these areas of sanctuary can have global implications. These examples are not limited to failed states, as even viable states, willingly or not, can provide sanctuary regions within their borders.

THE TRI-BORDER REGION

The area of South America known as the tri-border region is where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay intersect. The porous border of this lush jungle region provides a safe haven for black marketers and terrorist activity. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the region has come under the focus of international intelligence organizations and antiterrorism efforts.

Shortly after 9/11, authorities discovered that top terrorist operatives were meeting in the tri-border area to plan attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets in the western hemisphere. The meetings, which took place in and around Ciudad del Este, were attended by representatives of Hezbollah and other groups sympathetic to the al-Qaeda network. Evidence, such as thousands of counterfeit U.S. dollars, fake passports and wire-transfer receipts from the Middle East, were collected by Argentinean officials.

In 2003, several Hezbollah members, along with Iranian diplomats and security officials, were convicted by a court in Argentina on charges of perpetrating the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and of a Jewish community center two years later, killing a total of 114 people. Hezbollah's late security chief, Imad Mughniyeh, was believed to have been in charge of most of Hezbollah's operation in the tri-border region. He was suspected of having initiated and overseen the group's drug-trafficking and other operations in Latin America, which are likely funding Hezbollah's growth.

SOMALIA/EAST AFRICAN CORRIDOR

While many states contain pockets or regions of under-governed space, Somalia seems to be in a class of its own. Virtually the entire country is in shambles and has been without a functioning civil government since 1991. The interim government, installed in 2007, lacks legitimacy and is failing to provide any of the critical functions of a state. Given these factors, the recent activity emanating from Somalia should be of no surprise.

On Nov. 15, 2008, Somali pirates commandeered the Saudi-owned supertanker *Sirius Star*. This attack was impressive and significant for several reasons. First, this is the largest vessel ever to have been seized, carrying more than $100 million worth of crude oil and measuring longer than an aircraft carrier. Also, this was the first significant disruption of crude shipment in the region by pirates. Additionally, the hijacking took place an unprecedented distance offshore (more than 450 miles off the coast of Kenya) in vast open water where it is difficult and expensive to maintain control.

Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he was "stunned" at the circumstances of this seizure. "Certainly we've seen an extraordinary rise" in attacks, he said. "I am extremely concerned by the overall number."[4]

On April 8, 2009, Somali pirates again garnered the attention of the international media, as well as the White House, when they attempted to hijack the *Maersk Alabama*, an American cargo ship. The pirates held the ship's captain hostage for several days in a lifeboat before the situation was resolved by Navy special-operations snipers aboard the *USS Bainbridge*, who killed three of the pirates, captured a fourth, and freed Captain Richard Phillips unharmed.

On April 14, 2009, just days after the incident with the *Maersk Alabama*, a second U.S. ship, the *Liberty Sun*, was attacked by pirates. This time the crew managed to outmaneuver the pirates after sustaining some damage by rocket attacks and small-arms fire. These attacks represent the first real threat of piracy against U.S. ships in almost 200 years, dating back to President Thomas Jefferson and the wars against the Barbary Pirates of North Africa.

Capturing ships and taking crews for ransom in the waters off the Horn of Africa is a multi-million-dollar-a-year enterprise — and growing. The pirates can extort $1 million or more for each ship and crew. This makes piracy about the most attractive profession in Somalia. As of May 2009, more than 300 mariners from different countries remained captive at sea off the coast of Somalia.

While these attacks are taking place at sea, they are *staged* on land, within the lawless coastal towns and villages in Somalia. While adding more naval presence in the area may be prudent, it is not a long-term solution, nor does it get to the root of problem. The current government is unwilling or incapable of dealing with piracy, and the perpetrators appear to be building on their successes by getting bolder and more sophisticated. This puts the international community in a difficult position: countries must either accept the problem and make adjustments to absorb and avoid incidents of piracy, or take the direct approach and implementing measures on the ground to gain control, which would be difficult politically-considering the U.S. experience in Mogadishu in 1993-94.

BORDER OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

"Virtually every major terrorist threat that my agency is aware of has threads back to the tribal areas (of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border)."

Michael Hayden, CIA director[5]

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border is perhaps the epitome of sanctuary areas. Ungovernability in this region, the suspected hideout of the core al-Qaeda leadership, derives from an almost complete lack of state penetration into tribal societies and high social resistance to government authority. The Pashtun tribal areas on both sides of the border pose serious challenges to both the Afghani and Pakistani governments. The recent resurgence of the Taliban in this highly resistant area has become one of the most pressing international-security issues. Eight years after toppling the Taliban regime that gave sanctuary to al-Qaeda in late 2001, the U.S. and its allies still struggle to bring stability to the region.

State presence in the deceptively named Federally Administered Tribal Areas has always been tenuous. The British annexed the region during the 19th century, but they were never able to completely pacify the area. After its separation from British India in 1947, the Muslim state of Pakistan became an independent nation. The central government permitted the tribes in the region to manage their own affairs under the supervision of agents appointed by Islamabad. Since Pakistani laws did not formally extend to the tribal areas, disputes between individuals and tribes were adjudicated under the Pashtun tribal code of conduct — their own colonial-era legal codes.

Until military activity in the region during the spring of 2004, Pakistan had been reluctant to send its military forces into the region. As demonstrated by their strong resistance to these incursions, the population is heavily armed and seemly impervious to the rule of a centralized authority. Similar conditions exist elsewhere on the border, including the Baluchistan Province and the Northwest Frontier Province. Although central-government representatives have the ability to influence tribal behavior up to a point through coercion or monetary inducements, the state is merely one of a number of competing power centers.

Unpopular U.S. policies toward Pakistan that date back almost two decades have helped to create an entire generation of young Pakistani military officers who have had little direct contact and few relationships with American military personnel. In particular, the Pressler Amendment of 1990 banned military and economic assistance to Pakistan because of its nuclear-arms race with India. Recent direct-action strikes by the U.S. against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets in the Pakistani portion of the region are likely complicating an already fragile relationship between the U.S. and the Pakistani government. All these factors combine to make it difficult to achieve success against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in this region.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The examples above are a glimpse of tomorrow. Not much more than a generation ago, Somaliland was a quiet chain of coastal British and Italian colonies. Today, this nation-state-in-name-only is a platform from which freelance troublemakers can wreak havoc on the rest of the world. Today, pirates are already seizing vessels the size of aircraft carriers and assaulting U.S. merchant ships. Their capability in the future will be constrained only by their ambition. The same constraint goes for other trouble spots.

This subject matter is merely one facet of the future operating environment and the complex set of missions that will be demanded of Army special-operations forces and general-purpose forces across the operational spectrum in an era of persistent conflict. Primary irregular warfare activities — foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare and stability operations — are not new to the Department of Defense, but the January 2009 *Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review Report* acknowledges that these capabilities may not exist in sufficient capacity to meet the expected demand. Also, U.S. capabilities in information operations and public affairs must be able to dominate the realm against these irregular/non-state threats, which often use slow and weak media responses by the U.S. to sway public and international opinion to their advantage. Doctrine, organization, equipment and training will likely have to adapt over the next generation in order to effectively solve problems originating in these regions.

Questions and challenges posed by under-governed areas are:

- How do we more accurately predict state collapse/failure?
- How does the U.S. Army measure the relative weakness of states in a way that helps it make comparative judgments on prioritization and the allocation of limited resources and funding?
- What is the Army's role in fostering the cooperation of joint, interagency, international and multinational institutions to meet challenges in under-governed areas?
- How can we most effectively build or improve security in these states?
- How does the U.S. government (more specifically, the U.S. Army) deal (directly or indirectly) with extremist groups or criminal organizations in these places?
- What conditions require a microscopic footprint vs. a large presence of forces (SF detachment vs. a brigade combat team)?
- What about states that are capable of but unwilling to deal with threats inside their borders, or states that openly give sanctuary to our enemies?
- How do we keep a persistent presence of forces in these areas, and what challenges does that bring (i.e., what type of people and skills are needed, what are the requirements for supporting activities/operations in these areas)? **SW**

NOTES:

[1] Angel Rebasa, et al., *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007).

[2] Robert D. Kaplan, *"The Man Who Would Be Khan," The Atlantic, March 2004.*

[3] *The World Bank Group, Independent Evaluation Group, Low-Income Countries Under Stress (http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/licus06_map.html).*

[4] Chip Cummins, *"Oil Tankers Waylaid by Pirates," Wall Street Journal,* Nov. 18, 2008, A15.

[5] Michael Hayden, Remarks to the Atlantic Council, Nov. 13, 2008. Quoted in Central Intelligence Agency, Speeches and Testimony Archive 2008 (https://www.CIA.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony-archive-2008/directors-remarks-at-the-atlantic-council.html.

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Honing Medical Skills

By Major Michelle M. Ripka, Sergeant First Class David R. Angle, Sergeant First Class Michael R. Staimpel and Richard W. Strayer

The Special Operations Combat Medic Skills Sustainment Course, or SOCMSSC, and the Civil Affairs Medical Sergeant Course are key in the development of special-operations medics.

The Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center, or JSOMTC, is a 75,000-square-foot, multi-component medical training and education facility for special-operations forces, or SOF, located at Fort Bragg, N.C. The JSOMTC executes SOF-unique medical education and training for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM; USSOCOM service-component-command medics; and selected federal agencies, as approved by the USSOCOM commander, to produce special-operations combat medics who will be interoperable in their training and equipment.

Special-operations medics are among the most highly trained medics in the world. They have the ability to independently treat and stabilize multiple trauma patients in austere environments for extended amounts of time. A SOF medic's skill set consists of more than 150 critical tasks, many which are highly perishable. Their proficiency in those skills must be sustained through training. The SOCMSSC is designed to provide a forum in which all special-operations medics can retrain, recertify and share their lessons learned with other medics throughout the community.

SOCMSSC

SOCMSSC, formerly known as the Special Operations Forces Medical Skills Sustainment Program, conducted its first class Sept. 27, 1999. Currently, SOCMSSC is a nine-day course with 50 hours of didactic instruction and 32 hours of practical exercises and exams.

The course is open to all special-operations medics in the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps who are assigned within USSOCOM. Those medics are usually graduates of the Special Operations Combat Medic Course, also taught at JSOMTC. SOCMSSC is the only program in which SOF medics can recertify as advanced tactical practitioners, or ATPs. In USSOCOM Directive 350-29 (1 December 2008), USSOCOM mandated that all medics operating in a special-operations billet have a valid ATP card prior to deployment.

The first week of SOCMSSC training focuses on recertification of the special-operations medic's required civilian credentials. Those include basic life support, advanced cardiac life support, pediatric education for pre-hospital professionals and pre-hospital trauma life support. The second week of training focuses on tactical and military medicine. Students are trained in tactical combat casualty care, or TCCC; psychological emergencies, nuclear/biological/chemical emergencies, casualty evacuation, environmental emergencies, field blood transfusions, tactical medical emergency protocols, dental emergencies, physical therapy and advanced trauma skills.

The course culminates with a realistic and challenging five-hour field-training exercise, during which students are evaluated in the treatment and stabilization of a multisystem-trauma patient. Students are required to properly manage their patient through the three phases of TCCC: care under fire, tactical field care and tactical evacuation care.

SOCMSSC benefits

In addition to attaining the USSOCOM requirement of attending SOCMSSC, another benefit for the student is the opportunity to interact and share lessons learned with other SOF medics. Every class has a block of time dedicated to lessons learned. This instruction is completely student-driven and focuses on the experiences that SOF medics have had with mass-casualty incidents, equipment, disease patterns, treatments, etc.

SOCMSSC is also one of the forums that USSOCOM and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command use to disseminate the latest information to SOF medics. New equipment and protocols are frequently tested and disseminated.

Some of the latest SOF medical updates include:

- Woundstat, a hemostatic agent for hemorrhage control, is no longer authorized for use.

-Lateral canthotomy is a new critical task for all SOF medics and is taught in SOCMSSC.

-ATP is starting to gain reciprocity with state paramedic boards, starting with the state of Georgia.

Attending SOCMSSC

Class seats for SOCMSSC are controlled by the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, or ATRRS. USSOCOM has allocated seats to the course throughout the commu-

nity, based on the needs of each major command and parent unit. Once a unit has filled all its seats, it can put students on the wait-list for a class. The school code for SOCMSSC is School 331; Course 2E-F222/300-F21 (CT).

Army students need to coordinate with their unit or battalion schools NCO to be added to the SOCMSSC roster. The SOCMSSC cadre members do not have the authority to add names to the roster. Air Force students need to contact the Air Force Special Operations Command medical training manager, Master Sergeant Jared Schultz, by sending e-mail to: jared.schultz@hurlburt.af.mil, or telephoning DSN 579-2887.

Navy and Marine Corps students need to contact their unit's senior enlisted medical group person, who will then send the student information to Ronald Ruiz at the JSOMTC (ruizr@soc.mil, telephone: 910-396-4240). Students are required to request primary and alternate class attendance dates. That will allow some flexibility in the event that the Navy has already used all its slots for the primary class dates.

With few exceptions, SOCMSSC starts on a Monday and ends on the following Thursday. SOCMSSC operates on the Army Training and Doctrine Command ATRRS holiday-schedule system, so not every holiday on the calendar is observed. Class starts promptly at 6:45 a.m. on the first day of class and at 8 a.m. the remainder of the training days. Students should arrive in Fayetteville, N.C., one day before class starts and depart the day after class ends.

The maximum student load in SOCMSSC is 42. When more than 42 students arrive for training, students will be seated in the following priority:

a. Reserved slots on ATRRS.

b. Personnel TDY/TAD from OCONUS.

c. Wait-slots on ATRRS.

d. Personnel TDY/TAD from CONUS units.

e. Personnel based at Fort Bragg.

f. Personnel from other government agencies.

g. Commissioned officers.

h. Warrant officers.

The course will accept walk-ins when there are empty seats, but stand-by students fall into category "d" above. If service members' units cannot get reserved seats, having the student put into an ATRRS "wait" slot gives him a higher priority than he would have under a stand-by attempt.

All SOF medics must attend

^ **FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH** Staff Sergeant Michael Ceballos (left), the Special Warfare Medical Group veterinary NCOIC, demonstrates the proper procedure for floating teeth on an equine patient to students in the Civil Affairs Medical Sergeant Course. *Photo by SFC Michael Staimpel.*

SOCMSSC every two years in order to remain in a deployable status.

CA MEDICAL SERGEANT

A Civil Affairs medical sergeant is part of a rapidly deployable four-man Civil Affairs team. The medic on that team must be capable of operating independently in remote, austere and often hostile environments with minimal medical support or facilities and possess the ability to treat and sustain patients for up to 72 hours.

Currently the CA team medic position is held by a 68W (health care specialist), in the grade of E5 or above, who has completed the Special Operations Combat Medic Course, or SOCMC, and the Civil Affairs Medical Sergeant Course, called CAMS.

Beginning this year, selected Soldiers who have completed the Civil Affairs Specialist Course (MOS 38B) will attend the SOCMC. After graduating from the 26-week SOCM course, the Soldiers will then be enrolled into the six-week CAMS to earn the W4 identifier and officially become a Civil Affairs medical sergeant, 38BW4.

The intent of CAMS is to meet the CA mission need for an independent medical operator for active-Army CA teams in order to support the SOF commander's intent by facilitating or conducting civil-military operations and activities that support the tactical mission.

CAMS is designed to teach the Civil Affairs medical sergeant to conduct medical assessments, provide veterinary care, evaluate and institute preventive-medicine practices, plan and conduct medical civic-action projects and provide limited dental care to U.S. Soldiers and indigenous personnel. The course also teaches medics how to use available resources to research, compose and conduct a medical-threat brief for a specific area of operation.

The course consists of six areas or modules that concentrate on the prevention of and countermeasures for disease and nonbattle injuries, or DNBI. Those six areas are: public health, water purification, food-borne illnesses, arthropods, veterinary care and dental care. CAMS culminates with a medical-threat brief conducted by each student on the country of his choice, and a field training exercise, or FTX.

The first block of instruction deals with public-health issues. Public health involves communicable diseases, assessing field sites, basic microbiology, current medical deployment issues, and medical threats for field forces.

Next, students train in water purification and evaluate field water operations by performing water-point reconnaissance and surveys. Soldiers also learn to collect water samples, operate water-sampling equipment and perform bacteriological analysis. They collect water samples and perform multiple tests both in the field and back in the classroom. Soldiers apply their comprehension of water purification during the course FTX.

Students conduct a walk-through inspection of a dining facility and leave the course with the means and the ability to inspect a food-service facility. They learn proper food storage and learn to look for signs of cross-contamination, as well as time and temperature constraints that can cause food-borne illnesses. During the simulated outbreak of a food-borne illness, students learn to analyze and evaluate data on a suspected ailing population.

The next block addresses arthropods, such as mosquitoes, and the capability to employ the principles of an integrated pest-management plan. The plan is designed to use all appropriate technological and management techniques in order to bring about an effective degree of pest prevention and suppression in a safe, cost-effective and environmentally sound manner. Arthropod-borne diseases are a leading cause of DNBI. Students concentrate on specific diseases that arthropods transmit. They become very familiar with the proper resources and references for conducting a study of endemic diseases relevant to their deployment.

Students attend dental and veterinary classes concurrent with the Special Forces Medical Sergeant Course (18D). They are taught to advise local nationals about livestock production, including troubleshooting livestock problems and providing advice on increasing the production and development of resources. Areas of instruction include livestock and equine husbandry, disease-recognition and treatment, preventive medicine and herd-health medicine. Students are also taught to recognize and prevent zoonotic diseases. To complete the transition from livestock to the table, they are taught humane slaughter, including pre- and post-mortem inspection of food animals.

The last graded exercise is a medical-threat brief. Students learn to use proper medical planning and research on the country of their choice. They brief the class on possible medical threats in their selected country and on appropriate countermeasures for mission success.

CAMS provides a solid base for the CA medical sergeant to conduct thorough medical assessments. The CA medic must be able to assess, develop, resource, execute, re-assess and measure effects of programs within the host nation. In turn, they will be able to recommend projects and programs that are sustainable within that host-nation infrastructure.

The JSOMTC remains the lone institution capable of creating CA medical sergeants and sustaining special-operations medical forces in preparation for deployment in the war on terror.

Major Michelle M. Ripka, an Army nurse, is the officer in charge of the Special Operations Combat Medic Skills Sustainment Course and the Civil Affairs Medical Sergeant Course.

Sergeant First Class David R. Angle is the NCO in charge of the Special Operations Combat Medic Skills Sustainment Course.

Sergeant First Class Michael R. Staimpel is the NCO in charge of the Civil Affairs Medical Sergeants Course.

Richard W. Strayer, a retired Special Forces NCO, is chief of staff for the Special Operations Combat Medic Course.

Professional Development

DA PAM 600-3 HAS SIGNIFICANT ARSOF CHANGES

The new version of DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, scheduled for release during the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, contains significant changes to the chapters pertaining to Army special-operations forces. Listed below are the changes, which apply equally to Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces.

• Per the chief of staff of the Army, major's positions on transition teams, or TTs, and provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, are considered to be key and developmental. The proponent recommends that majors who serve in those positions seek a developmental assignment within their branch prior to serving on a TT or PRT in a major's position.

• Educational opportunities:

- The Naval Postgraduate School is open to officers, warrant officers and senior NCOs. The SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, or DSOP, conducts a board each August to select Soldiers for January and June starts. To receive credit for Intermediate Level Education, or ILE, and Joint Professional Military Education I, students must attend the P-950, ILE Preparatory Staff Course, prior to beginning NPS and complete the four Naval command staff courses while earning their master's degree.

- The Interagency Studies Program provides a degree that prepares officers for assignments in joint and interagency special-operations billets following their key and developmental assignments. ISP begins in August and finishes in July of the following year. Personnel attend ISP while attending ILE. DSOP conducts a board each November to select for August starts.

- School of Advanced Military Studies is a one-year program to provide selected officers and warrant officers with a broad education in the art and science of war at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. ARSOF officers who graduate from SAMS and are key-and-developmental-qualified will serve in a SAMS assignment. Officers not key-and-developmental-qualified will serve in a branch key-and-developmental-qualifying assignment prior to serving in a SAMS billet. For guidance on applying for SAMS, see the Career Notes in the July-August 2009 *Special Warfare*.

• Assignment to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School or the 1st Special Warfare Training Group is a preferred developmental assignment.

The following items are key changes to DA Pam 600-3 pertaining to CA:

- Majors – The position of company commander, Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, is a key and developmental assignment.

-Lieutenant colonels – Service as the deputy commander of a CA brigade is key and developmental.

- Positions of the chief, CA proponent, in the SWCS DSOP and of the CA division chief in the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine are designated for fill by former battalion commanders.

The following item is a key change pertaining to PSYOP: Positions of the chief, PSYOP proponent, in DSOP and of the PSYOP division chief in the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine are designated for fill by former battalion commanders.

The following items are key changes to DA Pam 600-3 pertaining to MOS 180A, SF warrant officer:

- SF warrant officers in grades CW3 through CW5 serve as staff operations warrant officers with the SF groups, as well as at higher commands within SF, Army SOF and joint SOF staffs. They may lead task-organized SOF elements as directed. They serve as senior warrant officer advisers, or SWOAs, to the commander for all warrant-officer matters and other interests as directed. Selected CW5s serve as the command chief warrant officer for the commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, or as the SWOA to commanders of the SF groups and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command as an integral part of the commander's personal staff.

- CW2s are eligible to attend the resident portion of the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course, or SF WOAC, after serving one year as a CW2 and completing the nonresident phase.

- CW3s should complete the SF WOAC not later than one year after promotion to CW3. They must complete it prior to promotion to CW4. SF CW2s in the Army National Guard must complete SF WOAC to be eligible for promotion to CW3.

- CW3s are eligible to attend the Warrant Officer Staff Course, or WOSC, after serving one year as a CW3.

- CW4s should complete the WOSC not later than one year after promotion to CW4 and must complete it prior to promotion to CW5. CW3s in the Army National Guard must complete the WOSC to be eligible for promotion to CW4.

- Intermediate Level Education – ILE is available to SF CW3s and CW4s. The one-year program awards ILE and JPME I credit. Ideally, an SF warrant officer should serve in a joint assignment in his first or second assignment subsequent to ILE completion.

The following items are key changes to DA Pam 600-3 pertaining to SF officers.

- Lieutenant colonel - The billet of the G3, USASFC, is designated to be filled by a former battalion commander.

- The positions of the SWCS G3; chief of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine's SF Division, Joint and Army Division and Training Development Division; and the SF proponent chief in DSOP are designated to be filled by former battalion commanders.

Warrant Officer

NEW 180A CAREER MANAGER AT HRC

CW4 Kevin Bone, previously assigned to the 7th SF Group, is the new SF warrant officer career manager for the Army Human Resources Command. He can be reached at DSN 221-5231, commercial (703) 325-5231 or by sending e-mail to: kevin.bone@conus.army.mil

SF WOI CONDUCTS FIRST CHANGE OF COMMAND

The SWCS Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute held its first change of command July 16. CW5 Tony Fox, who previously served as the SF warrant officer career manager for the Army Human Resources Command in Alexandria, Va., assumed command from CW4 Tommy Austin. Austin, who served as commandant for 15 months, will be returning to the 7th SF Group.

CA/PSYOP

CA continues to access qualified Soldiers

Civil Affairs continues to recruit qualified soldiers who meet the prerequisites listed in DA PAM 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure.*

Soldiers who are interested in reclassifying into CA should contact SFC Herring or SFC Pease at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion at DSN 239-9697 or commercial (910) 432-9697. CA is not currently accepting applications from sergeants first class or promotable staff sergeants.

For more information, Soldiers can visit https://perscomnd04.army.mil/MOSMARTBK.nsf/. Sign in using AKO user ID and password, then go to Chapter 10, 38B.

Information available about CA

Soldiers who need information about CA professional development can telephone the Civil Affairs senior career manager in the SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, MSG Ralph W. Weller, at (910) 907-4171, or send e-mail to: wellerr@ahqb.soc.mil.

CA Soldiers who wish to explore the possibilities of new assignments should contact MSG Palacios, Civil Affairs assignments manager, at (703) 325-8399 or send e-mail to: aldo.palacios@conus.army.mil.

Information available about PSYOP

Soldiers who would like more information about PSYOP opportunities or recruiting efforts should contact SFC Ginos or SSG Agee in the Special Operations Recruitment Battalion, DSN 239-6533/5786 or commercial (910) 396-6533/5786. For information about assignments, contact MSG Vernon at the Army Human Resources Command, DSN 221-8901. For other questions related to the PSYOP career-management field, contact MSG Mick Tilley, PSYOP senior career manager, at DSN 236-4349, or send e-mail to: william.tilley@soc.mil.

Professional Development

POLICY WILL ALLOW MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS TO ATTEND SFQC

On June 22, the commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, approved the reinsertion of multinational partners into the Special Forces Qualification Course, or SFQC.

The new policy is designed to enhance interoperability with partnered nations, foster relationships and reinforce the importance of cross-cultural communication. Changes will go into effect in January 2010. There will be no change to SFQC nomination procedures, vetting requirements or prerequisites.

Multinational partners will be encouraged to attend the SFQC four times per year. The maximum number of international students per class is set at 12 (six officers and six NCOs) — 48 per year.

To earn the SF tab, multinational partners will be required to meet the same SFQC standards as their U.S. counterparts: a minimum of 70 percent on all tests and student-evaluation plans, per SCWS Regulation 350-12, *Academic Policy and Procedures*. Multinational partners who fail to meet all prescribed standards will receive a certificate of course attendance.

2010 ENLISTED PROMOTION BOARDS SLATED

The 2010 Master Sergeant Selection Board will convene Oct. 14 through Nov. 6, 2009. The 2010 Sergeant First Class Selection Board will convene in February 2010. All NCOs in the zone for consideration for either board should validate their enlisted record brief and Official Military Personnel Folder for accuracy and ensure that their DA photo is up-to-date.

AMERICAN PATRIOT: THE LIFE AND WARS OF COLONEL BUD DAY

As our nation continues to fight the war on terror, we can find examples of service members from our military who exemplify many of the outstanding qualities highlighted in the book, *American Patriot: The Life and Wars of Colonel Bud Day*, by Robert Coram. Some of the qualities examined in the book — honor, integrity and courage — are often made light of in our society, but they are indispensable for those serving in the military. This book provides the reader with a profile of retired Colonel George "Bud" Day, who lived, valued and exemplified those qualities throughout his life and military career.

This book illustrates the life of a real American hero who demonstrates courage, honor and sacrifice. Day's fascinating journey begins with enlisting in the Marines during World War II, includes his stint during the Vietnam War as a prisoner of war, and his ultimately becoming one of the most decorated officers in the modern history of the U.S. military. After his military career, Day fought for benefits on behalf of hundreds of thousands of veterans, winning a stunning victory against the government. Day's life demonstrates courage and sacrifice.

The biography begins with Day's upbringing in a poor home in Sioux City, Iowa, and continues to the present day and his current residence in Florida. Day's military career began in 1942, when he dropped out of high school to enlist in the Marine Corps. He served three years in the South Pacific but did not get to see the combat he yearned for. After the war, Day headed home, where he earned a law degree.

In 1950, Day joined the National Guard and applied to fly fighter jets in the Air Force. He missed combat during the Korean War but was still considered by his peers to be a skilled aviator and an outstanding officer. The reader follows his career through these early years, focusing on the incidents that made Day the man he is and the challenges that prepared him for his life-changing experience during the Vietnam War.

In 1967, Day was made commander of a new squadron of F-100 jets and tasked with the forward-air-control mission. His job was to lead a select group of pilots on a new mission of seeking out targets and marking those targets so that other aircraft could destroy them. On Aug. 26, 1967, Day was shot down and suffered serious injuries during the ejection. Day was quickly captured, but despite his injuries, he was able to escape. He spent 12-15 days evading the enemy, making it all the way to South Vietnam before his luck ran out and he was recaptured.

Day was taken back to North Vietnam to face his greatest challenge — life as a POW. During the five and one half years he was held in captivity, he faced torture and pain from his captors. During all his years as a POW, Day kept the Code of Conduct in mind, and he refused to cooperate with his captors. He vowed never to give information to the North Vietnamese about his top-secret, highly effective unit. Day's captivity is the focus of the largest portion of the book and some of the most interesting reading. To witness what Day and the other POWs endured will make any American proud of these men who returned home with their honor intact.

In 1973, Day was released and returned home. His experiences enabled him to continue fighting for ideas in which he believed and to combat injustices against those who serve this country. After his retirement from the military, he started a law practice and fought on behalf of hundreds of thousands of veterans who, in 1995, were being threatened with the loss of their medical benefits. He fought the U.S. government with the same determination and courage that he had displayed years before in North Vietnam.

Day has lived an incredible life and is a patriot. To witness what belief in oneself, country and God can do is an inspiration for any reader. This book is highly recommended for any member of the military or for those interested in military history. ***SW***



DETAILS

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